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Abstract
Talking about, and learning lessons from The American War in Vietnam can be a process whose
genuine engagement requires a suspension—even if temporary—of moral and cultural biases
that are embedded in the Western mindset. This research project is one that composes military
strategy, government rhetoric, and very human accounts of war in Vietnam in order to
understand how people in Hanoi experience and talk about war, with an ultimate aim of making
some of these stories and lessons digestible to a Western audience.
My findings discuss some key components of the North Vietnamese mindset towards the
American War in Vietnam: the relevant historical context regarding foreign occupation,
patriotism and unity, duty and defense, and some overall effects of attacks and bombs, with a
deeper focus on what I found to be the most important aspect: unity. I then compare the picture
of this mindset with some respective elements of the U.S American wartime mentality. The
ultimate pursuit of this research is increased understanding and diplomacy between nationalities
and philosophies, as well as advocacy for human-oriented analysis of international conflicts in
general.
This is a project oriented towards epistemology and constructivism. A constructivist approach to
studying war is a human approach to studying war, and it is one that helps us to understand the
true impact of governmental decisions that might seem distant to us. Analysis of war without
adequate attention to the human dimension, at its worst, risks uninformed policy decisions and
inaccurate historical analysis.
Key words: American War in Vietnam, Vietnam War, government rhetoric, propaganda,
“People’s War,” Communism, Eastern philosophy, collectivism, individualism, morale.
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A Note on Word Choice
As one component of my study is word choice and word usage, I will take a moment to clarify
some vocabulary choices. To refer to concepts, events, groups, or ideas in general—when I am
not pointing to a particular political agenda or perspective—I will attempt to use the clearest
word choice available.
-American War in Vietnam: This is the term I will use to describe the war between Vietnam
and the United States from 1955 to 1975.
-North Vietnamese Army: Rather than Viet Minh, People’s Army of Vietnam, or other names,
North Vietnamese Army provides the most direct reference to the army that fought for this
region.
-Viet Cong: I will use this terminology to refer to the resistance army in South Vietnam, to
distinguish them from the pro-American forces and the North Vietnamese Army.
-propaganda: This is not a note on a specific word choice, but more a note on acknowledging
biases. Propaganda is frequently talked about in a negative light in popular US discourse, but it is
important to remember to contextualize propaganda and recall that the US also engages in the
use of propaganda, as evidenced by this pamphlet from the American War in Vietnam.

(Image 1.1-American War Propaganda Poster-Krueger, Gitter, Beiswenger)
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Introduction
“The human factors of the insurgency were therefore understood only in an impressionistic and
intuitive fashion. This was bound to affect policy decisions with respect to counter-insurgency.”
-1965 Report by Rand Group on Viet Cong Motivation
“…because the popular view of the Vietnam War focuses on Americans in combat…it is
fundamentally ahistorical.”
-Michael Hunt, A Vietnam War Reader
As a Western citizen, it is no small task to attempt to understand and empathize with an
Eastern-influenced mindset. Our bias can transcend mere differences in lifestyle. As David Black
(n.d) notes, Westerners might hold complicated, deep biases in areas such as “privileging the
agenda of the self” and “trusting history less than change.” These kinds of biases can seem
impossible to translate and navigate. Therefore, a reasonable approach to foster understanding, is
a full—even if temporary—attempt at immersion into another’s mindset and philosophy. This
immersion is particularly pertinent in the case of the American War in Vietnam. Understanding a
historical period so controversial that much of its basic terminology risks bias requires a careful
and patient analysis of perspectives besides our own.
Empathy towards an Eastern mindset can be described using the literary term “suspension
of disbelief.” This term is defined as “a willingness to suspend one's critical faculties and believe
the unbelievable; sacrifice of realism and logic for the sake of enjoyment.” (Dictionary.com) I
have reframed this definition to suit this project: “a willingness to suspend one's critical faculties
and understand the uncomfortable; sacrifice of moral bias for the sake of understanding.” As
Samuel Taylor Coleridge once grappled with our ability to empathize with fictional characters,
so too can we call upon this impetus now, to empathize with those who see the world differently
from we do. To try and see clearly this information and logic is a critical first step to
understanding a historical event whose retellings are often mired in political sentiment.
It was from this philosophy that I crafted my research proposal. I acknowledge that there
is something untraditional about fitting a somewhat philosophical approach into a standard
research format. Some of my findings are, by definition, subjective. To gather insight on the
human dimension of war in Vietnam requires loosening a reliance on “hard facts,” commonly
told histories, or instincts to judge based on our own understandings of morality. Much of the
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human dimension of war was not lived out in the realms of international politics or historical
“truths”.
This is a project oriented towards epistemology and constructivism. A constructivist
approach to war is a human approach to war, and it is one that helps us to understand the true
impact of governmental decisions that might seem distant to us. To challenge how we in the U.S
know what we know can produce moving results: a recognition of the forces that shape our
understanding of the world. I have chosen rhetoric as my means to exploring an epistemological
and constructivist approach; words play a significant role in how we decide what we know, and
how we construct our meanings and narratives of our world. This logic will gain meaning as it is
further contextualized in this study.
Delving into the perspective of the citizenry of Vietnam did not always prove to be
straightforward. As I am working in a country with a strong centralized government where
freedom of speech is not a given, it is hard to define or capture what a “true Vietnamese
perspective” means. Yet, when I turned towards literature, eager to understand the role of
Vietnamese propaganda and government control of the national conversation, I realized that my
pursuit might be more possible than I once thought. The pervasive impact of patriotic
propaganda in Vietnam showed me that the party or government perspective the war often did
shed light on the people’s opinion of it. And, by temporarily suspending my bias toward total
freedom of thought, I gained more insight into the Vietnamese mindset.
I began to see that warring with America prompted the Communist Party to adopt a
tactical way of looking at truth and at patriotism, viewing the national mindset as a deeply
important aspect of strategy when facing a foe with superior technology and greater material
resources. How does a government mobilize a people to machine-like efficiency and dedication
without forcing them to sacrifice their humanity and community? By divorcing analysis of the
American War in Vietnam from political sentiment, a very human account of strategy and tough
choices began to materialize.
During a focus group, one North Vietnamese Army veteran asked me what could be done
to stop war from happening. He wondered if I understood the gravity and complexity of what I
was asking: how could I question people about what they “thought” of war? I responded with the
best answer I could—the core of this research topic—increased understanding, empathy, and
dialogue between people. If nothing else, I hope this research project achieves the goals of
-7-|Page

humanizing the North Vietnamese perspective of the American War in Vietnam and prompting
Western readers to practice some empathy towards life during this time. Oftentimes, we allow
legitimate concerns of seemingly incompatible mindsets to hinder us from exercising the
compassion of which we might be capable. Or, if “compassion” and “empathy” seem to be too
loaded of terms to talk about this bloody era, perhaps frame this exploration around increased
understanding; for no diplomatic goals can be responsibly considered without some degree of
mutual understanding.
The body of my research will be organized thusly: I will begin with a briefing on
Vietnam’s relevant history for the past few centuries to provide context; I will then move into
presenting some important philosophical elements of the North Vietnamese mindset in light of
my literature. First, following up on the relevant history, I will offer some findings on the impact
of foreign occupation on the Vietnamese mindset, and how these historical realities often served
to motivate and unify Hanoians. I will then go deeper into this idea of unity in Vietnam, mostly
focusing on the deliberate actions by the Communist Party to foster ideological unity amongst
Vietnamese people. Next, I will note the devastating impact of bombs and destruction to
ultimately support an the undeniable spirit of duty and defense amongst the North Vietnamese.
These sections will provide a baseline but holistic view of the North Vietnamese war mindset,
which I will briefly contrast with the respective American war mindset. The Data and Analysis
section will follow a similar pattern, pausing for deeper reflection on the terms nhân dân, hy
sinh, and Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước and spending more time reflecting on rhetoric
in general.
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Methodology
The overall outline and scheduling of my research required some flexibility, particularly
in that my in-depth interviews occurred earlier than intended. However, these interviews with Vu
The Long and Le Van Lan proved to be quite helpful in framing my subsequent research. From
talking to Le Van Lan, I picked up some key words and phrases as well as insight into the very
deliberate and open use of propaganda by the Vietnamese government. From speaking with Vu
The Long, I learned about the material dimension of life during this time and gained another
valuable war narrative.
My original research questions and survey drafts prompted respondents to explain their
experiences with and thoughts on war in general. However, it quickly became clear, perhaps
because I am American, that my interviewees and survey respondents had the most to say about
the American War in Vietnam. While my initial proposal was not framed around this war
exclusively, focusing on it has been beneficial when performing research on this scale and within
this timeframe.
It was from the mindset of exploring the human dimension of war that I developed my
research methods. After conducting my in-depth interviews, I began drafting my initial survey. I
administered a detailed written survey to a group of Hanoians above 50 years of age and
facilitated a focus group. I then administered a shorter oral questionnaire to random participants
at Hoan Kiem Lake.I gathered key quotes and anecdotal evidence from these sessions which I
viewed alongside my literature.
Written Survey and Focus Group
The first type of survey I developed was to be answered in writing. It was longer than my
later draft and was designed for people with whom I could not communicate in English.
Admittedly, this earlier version and the responses it garnered helped me make edits on the
random oral survey I later administered. This written survey version was given to a group of 9
adults that were over 50. This group was formed through convenience sampling. I had this
survey translated into Vietnamese and allowed the participants to fill in their responses. A
picture of this survey is on the following page.
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(Figure 1.1- In-depth Written Survey)
This survey is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on war in general. This is also the
section of the survey where I sought to learn more about how the government talks about
wartime adversaries. Part II asks for reflection and memories of a single war (most chose to talk
about the war with America). Part III asks for open-ended wartime connotations of the words
nhân dân, hy sinh and Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước. To my surprise and appreciation,
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what was intended to be a written survey session also turned in to a focus group. I gained much
insight about life during war as well as Vietnamese mentalities from this group, which included
two veterans of the American War in Vietnam. Quotes and anecdotes I learned in this session are
analyzed in the Data section.
Random Oral Survey
When discussing any topic relating to history in Vietnam, a respondent’s age makes an
undeniable impact on their response. This notion has been confirmed to me through discussion
with Vietnamese of many ages as well as a small-scale case study on high school education in
Da Lat. Therefore, for my surveying, I chose to create quotas for different age ranges. They
original quotas are as follows.
Child (5- 10 people)
Young adult (age 15-30, 15 people)
Middle adult (age 30-50, 15 people)
Older adult (age 50+, 15 people)
I developed the age divisions of these brackets with help of a student at Hanoi University.
We agreed upon these age brackets because of respondents’ life experiences in regards to war.
For example, people in the “older adult” age group were all born during or before the year 1966,
meaning they were all alive during the American War in Vietnam and Chinese border wars.
Additionally, some of the older correspondents in this group had memories to share of the French
occupation period. Middle and young adults were either not alive or too young for a full
comprehension of human affairs during this war, though their insight was valuable for
discovering the impacts of war on the mindsets of subsequent generations.
This breakdown was helpful in initially approaching surveying, but I did not end up
completing my surveying as I had originally planned. As we attempted the survey with children,
it became evident that many of the questions were too complicated for a child to answer, and
engaging with this age bracket would likely require development of a new survey draft.
Therefore, in order to keep this project feasible under the time constraints, I shifted my focus to
the older age groups. Additionally, due to an unexpected hindrance on my interpreter’s ability to
meet for surveying, I was only able to gather 26 oral surveys instead of my expected number: 45.
Of the 26, I spoke to ten young adults, ten middle age adults, and six older adults.
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As my topic is less concerned with pursuing a completely accurate narrative and more
oriented towards with the popular narrative (which is not to say the popular narrative is
inaccurate), I felt the purpose of my survey was to get a sense of how people in Vietnam talk
about war, and ideally view this alongside some narratives of the Communist Party. Rather than
collecting quantitative data for statistical analysis, I chose to design my random surveys so that
the respondents would be able to speak freely and at length. I have included an image of both
pages of my random survey:

(Figure 1.2- Random Oral Survey)
I conducted this survey at Hoan Kiem Lake and at Nguyen Linh’s residence, both located
in Hanoi. No names of participants were recorded, and all refusal to take the survey or refusal to
answer any questions was respected.
The survey is divided into 3 parts. Part I was an effort to understand the impact of war on
the individual respondent’s life and allow the participant to enter the mindset of thinking about
war. Part II of the survey gave the opportunity for more in-depth reflection on a specific
experience of a war, and also included a very important and telling question: what do you think
was the strongest part of Northern Vietnam’s strategy during this war?
Part III delved more into the Vietnamese mindset, attempting to gain understanding about
how Vietnamese people talk about themselves and their lives during wartime. The phrases I
- 12 - | P a g e

asked about, nhân dân, hy sinh, and later dân tộc came to me through reading Vietnam at War by
Mark Phillip Bradley and in my in-depth interviews with historian Le Van Lan and archaeologist
Vu The Long (Bradley 2009, Lan 2016, Long 2016). By asking about these words, I was able to
consider whether the propagated government terminology had its desired impact of reaching
“hearts and minds. “
As stated before, these findings were considered alongside the relevant literature’s
information regarding the popular narrative.
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Literature Review
Timeline: War in Vietnam
Before embarking reflection of Vietnam’s history, a very brief reminder of this history is
in order.

(Image 1.2-Vietnam Timeline-Whitaker’s 2012)
I have outlined the relevant historical period, which spans roughly the mid 1940’s to the mid
1970’s. Recall that the era from 1945 to 1954 was the French Indochina War, where France
eventually relinquished the control of Vietnam that they had possessed since the mid nineteenth
century (Whitaker’s 2012). Soon after the French Indochina War, in 1955, began the American
War in Vietnam, which lasted until 1975 (History.com). Recall these rough historical periods to
contextualize any dates mentioned in this project.
A Socialist and Patriotic Mindset
“Better to conquer hearts than citadels.”
-Le Loi, 1426

As building the foundations for a socialist mindset proved to be a trying and deliberate
process for the Communist Party, so too is developing the best framing to explain this mindset.
The organization of the literature review is as follows: I will begin with discussion of the
impact of Vietnam’s history with foreign occupation, with a focus on French colonialism. Taking
this history into consideration alongside the information in the next section—regarding
deliberate and organic unity in Vietnamese culture—together with a note on the consequences of
bombs and destruction to galvanize support, will progress into the following section on the
strong sense of duty in Vietnam. Lastly, I will contrast what I have noted about the Vietnamese
mindset with some components of the respective U.S American mindset.
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Impact of Eras of Foreign Occupation
“A sense of Vietnamese national identity…grew in reaction to foreign interventions.”
-Stanley Karnow

It is difficult to distill the impact of foreign occupation and influence on Vietnam into one
or two words. Life experiences, generational differences, personal dispositions create myriad
interpretations of foreign powers among individuals.
Yet, there are some relevant sentiments expressed about the centuries of foreign influence
that shed some light on the North Vietnamese mindset. In this section, I will share some
information on expressed attitudes towards the French, as their Western similarity to Americans
and lengthy history with Vietnam provide a foundation for meaningful analysis of the
Vietnamese perspective. I will follow with some findings regarding sentiments toward U.S
American involvement in Vietnam.
Many aspects of life under French colonialism in Vietnam were unabashedly abusive.
The colonial government weaved demeaning behavior into their policy; engaging in many
dastardly tactics such as addicting the Vietnamese to opium (Karnow 1997). Additionally,
France strategically divided Vietnam into three different sections: Tonkin-North Vietnam,
Annam-Central Vietnam, and Cochinchina-South Vietnam (Hunt 2010).
Kim Ngoc and Mark Phillip Bradley distill of some of the impacts of this era of
domination on Vietnamese attitudes, shedding light on two of the particularly lasting offenses of
the time: humiliation and disunity. Says Bradley (2009), “French domination provoked a class of
Vietnamese tradition trained in Confucian classics and oriented toward political service to
engage in an ever deeper and more desperate way to end Vietnam’s humiliating condition.” Not
only did the era of French occupation prompt a patriotism-based commitment to fighting for
national sovereignty, but “the fragmentation of colonialism has made the Vietnamese extremely
sensitive to the issue of organization, and the history of modern Vietnam can be seen as quest for
đoàn thể,” in English, community or union (Kim 2002). Viewing French colonialism in this way
begins to explain how its longevity contributed to a mobilized and unified front of Vietnamese
citizens.
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This unity was long-lasting, and existed among citizens as well as along the war front.
According to a U.S government-commissioned, 1965 report on “Viet Cong” morale, after
independence from France, many Vietnamese viewed subsequent struggles with the United
States as “a continuation of the war of independence against the French.” (It is important to note
that this report was about the Viet Cong, most of whom were from the southern portion of
Vietnam. Yet, I do believe the findings belong alongside analysis of viewpoints of people in
North Vietnam. While the Viet Cong was far from the lotus of the revolutionary movement, they
were receiving instructions and education from the same overseeing body as the North and were
ultimately hugely important in implementing the agenda of the Viet Minh. Additionally, this
research was performed talking to Viet Cong POWs. I kept these ideas in mind when considering
its conclusions (Encyclopædia Britannica).) On a larger scale, many older members of the Viet
Cong viewed the struggle against the Americans as a part of the struggle to reestablish
Vietnamese independence, a “struggle between Vietnam’s legitimate leaders and usurpers
protected by a foreign power” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Expressing the trials of this era in
these terms suggests that any outsider attempting to influence Vietnam is not welcome, and that a
history of defending Vietnam’s national identity produced generations of Vietnamese ready to
protect their country. It is quintessential to realize that the Vietnamese mind has resisted
colonization, and that interventionist actions perhaps designed to foster freedom can have the
exact opposite effect. After centuries of protecting their national identity, Vietnamese resisted
any international presence oriented towards control.
Yet, what of the other players on the word stage? Indeed, U.S action in Vietnam did not
occur within an international vacuum. Major communist thinkers and activists, such as Vladimir
Lenin, were well aware of the struggle in the East. During this time, Lenin wrote an essay
declaring Communist powers’ support for those oppressed and struggling against capitalism
(Bradley 2009). In the wake of an era where the influence of outsiders served to dehumanize,
disenfranchise, and divide Vietnamese people, it is not difficult to understand how appealing and
refreshing it might have felt for an outsider to both validate the Vietnamese struggle and speak in
a way that is so strongly evocative of inclusivity and of common purpose.
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Unity
“Peasants, workers, and intellectuals all crowded into the ranks of the armed forces of the revolution.”
-General Vo Nguyen Giap

The Vietnamese government utilized communist philosophy to foster the development of
a singleness of mind and of purpose. In analysis of these efforts, a renewal of suspending moral
bias is essential; Westerners must attempt to temporarily place these biases—in areas such as
freedom of speech and thought—on our mental backburner. After undertaking this action, a
logical understanding of the government’s actions during this time is possible.
1948 Second National Congress of Culture
This meeting, and the action it subsequently sprouted, highlight the deep connection
between language, politics, self, and country. In attendance were high-status artists and
intellectuals, who enjoyed a liberal intellectual atmosphere until this point. Cognizant of the
heavy impact of the work of this intelligent class, the Communist Party resolved to alter this
atmosphere in order to exploit the talent of these individuals for the revolutionary cause. Recall
that in 1948, Vietnam was in the midst of a war with the French. Consistent with collectivist
values, artists were encouraged to relinquish the element of self-expression in their art as part of
a Communist policy some called kháng chiến, kiến quốc, which translates to “nation-building
resistance” (Kim 2002). While this congress was remembered wistfully by many as the last time
that Vietnamese intellectuals were allowed to discuss and debate freely, it is important to note
that members of this class were also in agreement about the intense need to mobilize for the
cause of national defense and independence (Kim 2002).
The 1949 Conference of Debate in Việt Bắc
While many socialist-focused initiatives were conceptualized at the 1948 conference, the
1949 conference was where much of the work was undertaken. Artists and intellectuals were
chosen to front the labor of affecting a region-wide ideological component of the Communist
party. The agenda of this conference was as follows:
1. Specify ideological content
2. Decide on different literary and cultural forms to promote such content
3. Shape structure of intellectual activities (Kim 2002)
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“Thus,” as Kim Ngoc Bao Ninh explains, “the time had come to tighten control over intellectuals
and their activities not only to rein in discussions that might get out of hand but to make sure that
the tools were available to inspire people to the level of sacrifice necessary for the resistance”
(Kim 2002). Indeed, propaganda and education are vital for maintaining a group commitment to
communist values. As the data analysis section will show, sacrifice, or hy sinh in Vietnamese, is
a highly sentimental, galvanizing term of wartime. Vietnamese officials planned this conference
with a specific 1949 military campaign in mind; the Party ostensibly knew the level of sacrifice
that this campaign would require.
“Văn nghệ nhân dân”;“Cách mạng hóa tư tưởng, quần chúng hóa sinh hoạt”
“People’s literature and art”;“Revolutionize ideology, popularize activities”

These two phrases describe some of the aforementioned labor of converting a society to
a more socialist mindset. The Communist Party was undertaking a substantial task: redefining
people’s view of self. Revolutionizing art required a critical analysis of art forms, artists’ chosen
perspectives, and their subjects.
One occurrence of this conference, the artistic transition of Nguyễn Đình Thi, serves as
a bridge of understanding from an individualist mindset towards a collectivist one. According to
Communist critics of Thi, his poetry was “outdated, dark, and complex” (Kim 2002). Though he
possessed a poetic voice that might be accepted by a Western audience, Thi was encouraged to
rethink his style because “his poetry is a reflection of part of his soul rather than the voice of the
masses” (Kim 2002). While much of the resistance struggle of Vietnam was indeed painful,
words of pain that were deemed “non-legitimate” were thought to be irreconcilable with the
sentiments of the public struggle (Kim 2002).
As Ngoc explains, Party culture authority Tố Hữu had the final say. Hữu asserted that
while he himself understood Thi’s poetry, appreciating the sad and wistful tone and even
acknowledged that he empathized with the feelings it expressed, Thi’s work was not
motivational (Kim 2002). Staging a revolution requires work. Hữu pointed out that he could not
use “I” as criteria of whether or not a poem is good, but poetry must rather be evaluated based on
the public perception and subsequent reaction (Kim 2002). As Kim poignantly notes, poets were
losing control over the direction of their work while simultaneously being put in charge of so
much more, now finding themselves key components of their nation’s revolution (Kim 2002).
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Analyzing the initiatives enacted at these conferences allows for insight into some
components of the philosophy of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Namely, I noted the
indication of a deep acknowledgement to artists and intellectuals as key tools to reach the masses
and establishing ideologies and narratives. Additionally, as controlling public thought and
dialogue is as controversial as it is difficult, these conferences indicate a Party understanding that
liberation was important enough to warrant censoring the work of the intelligent class.
The Party ostensibly viewed the work of education in a similar utilitarian light. As Kim
explains, by 1951, it was widely understood that “the party must take the offensive, explicitly
and concretely, in thought reform policy, as it moved to prepare for…eventual victory” (2002).
The educational happenings of this time also provide insight into people’s considerable
dedication to thought reform policy. Some politically indoctrinated students began organizing
“struggle sessions” (Kim 2002). These sessions, that frequently turned violent, occurred when
students attempted to correct the potentially counterrevolutionary thoughts of their peers. This
practice employed impactful rhetoric, calling students who behaved unacceptably Việt gian, or
“traitor” (Kim 2002).
In fact, similar rhetoric was noted in the report on 1965 Viet Cong morale. In order to
keep the ranks of the Viet Cong both unified and deeply committed to the cause, “backwardness
[was] prohibited,” “backwardness” referring to activities that can be viewed as individualistic or
selfish. These examples speak to the immense power of stigmatization and critique among the
Vietnamese, a phenomenon that has been noted by Bob Chenoweth, a veteran of the American
War in Vietnam and a former Prisoner of War at Hỏa Lò Prison. Chenoweth amazingly credits
his time in captivity at the “Hanoi Hilton” as the time when he “began understanding another
race” (Kernan 1978). Perhaps his experiences can speak to some of the cross-cultural
understanding that this research aims for. According to Chenoweth, “they [the prison guards]
didn’t like it when we fought because it was the first rule that you can’t change people’s minds
with force. Criticism, peer pressure, is very important in their society, but we don’t have that, it
means zip to us” (Kernan 1978). Indeed, these social mechanisms of the Vietnamese mindset
were imperative in fostering a collective spirit in a military context as well as a civilian one.

- 19 - | P a g e

People’s War
“…this invincible weapon which is people’s war.”
-General Vo Nguyen Giap

In an interview with Deutsche Welle international news, historian Derek Frisby called
Vo Nguyen Giap ‘a master of revolutionary war’ (Domínguez 2013). Not only was Giap credited
for ousting the French and Americans from Vietnam, but he was renowned as a brilliant military
theorist. In a popular 1970 work Military Art of People’s War, Giap explores some core
questions and key strategies of the “People’s War” approach.
He begins a section entitled “People’s Army, People’s War” with a head-on analysis of
the question “Why were the Vietnamese people able to win?” (against the French—recall that the
U.S War in Vietnam was still occurring) (Giap 1970). In Giap’s words, “the Vietnamese people
were able to win because their war of liberation was a people’s war” (Giap 1970). In subsequent
paragraphs, Giap explores the “People’s War” concept, citing familiar ideas regarding the
steadfast determination and tireless unity of the People’s Army. He summarizes “People’s
Army” in this way: “the Vietnam army [is] a child of the people. The people, in return, give it
unsparing affection and support. Therein lies the inexhaustible source of its power” (Giap 1970).
Comparing the more ambivalent mindset of the United States military with a force of such
deeply engrained unity and an “inexhaustible source of…power,” contextualizes the North
Vietnamese military victory. Giap also underlines the importance of the “mutual affections of
brother-in-arms” and the work of propaganda and education amongst the masses as vitally
important for sustaining revolutionary fervor (1970). Giap reiterates the importance of the
Vietnam People’s Army comprising members of all classes, a “worker peasant alliance” with an
ultimate goal of securing national independence (1970).
Equally important strategically is cultivating a long-term orientation within the
revolutionary force (Giap 1970). As expressed in the Viet Cong morale report, for many
members of the military, winning the fight against America meant exhausting America’s troops.
The following conversation was a common one amongst researchers and Viet Cong POWs.
Reports the Rand Corporation (1965):
“We asked how long they thought the war would last. Many said they thought it
would be a long war, but some said “It cannot last very much longer now.” When
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we asked, “What do you think will be the outcome?” a frequent answer was, “The
war will continue until one side becomes worn out.” When we probed further, “Do
you see one side getting tired yet?” the answer tended to be, “Yes, and it’s not our
side.”

Rallying Includes All Classes
Walking the streets of Hanoi today, it is not uncommon to see what most Americans
would immediately identify as “propaganda” of the legendary historical figure Ho Chi Minh.
This is as evident in his grandiose and meticulously attended mausoleum as it is in street art that
evokes familial appreciation for “Uncle Ho’s” deep commitment to his people.

(Image 1.3-Street Art of Ho Chi Minh. Photo taken by Maggie Norsworthy)
One influential address from Ho Chi Minh provides some insight into the Vietnamese
people’s respect and affection for this figure, as well as the power of revolutionary rhetoric to
reach people of all classes. Says “Uncle Ho,”
“Dear Fellow Countrymen! National salvation is the common cause of our
entire people. Every Vietnamese must take part in it. He who has money
will contribute his money, he who has strength will contribute his strength,
he who has talent will contribute his talent” (Hunt 2010).
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Indeed, this quote not only exemplifies the sense of duty instilled in citizens, but the
notion that traditional indicators of power or status were not required in order to contribute to the
country’s liberation. For one other example of the depth of Vietnamese commitment to the
revolutionary cause from all levels of society, one need not look farther than a 2000 obituary for
former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Where most obituaries might note the family members
that the deceased is survived by, Pham’s was a bit different. Interestingly, there was no public
information available regarding Pham’s family. This was the result of a deliberate, life-long
decision by Pham in order to send the message that he was primarily loyal to the revolutionary
cause. In a culture where family ties have a deep significance, Pham’s choice demonstrates an
extremely deep level of commitment.
Indeed, towards Vietnamese from every walk of life, the Communist Party aimed to
garner increasing power over thought and action, encouraging full-fledged support of the
revolution from all citizens. Standing up against the French—and later the United States, Japan,
and China—required nothing less than full commitment from all facets of the nation. Yet, there
existed additional external factors that undoubtedly underscored message preached by the party,
assuring Vietnamese that their country needed reform. These factors included artillery
bombardment from the U.S.

Other exacerbating factors: bombs and loss
“For the first time in a generation armed and unarmed peasants have arisen in Vietnam to press their
demands...”
-Edourd Daladier (Karnow 1997)

Bombs, for all the devastation they foster, have an uncanny tendency to mobilize or
even revolutionize the afflicted population. Henry Grabar (2013) uses the example of the U.S
bombing of Cambodia—which spanned 8 years and included 2.7 million tons of explosives—to
illustrate the impact of explosives on community sentiment towards those dropping the bombs.
According to journalist Richard Dudman, the bombing and the shooting "was radicalizing the
people of rural Cambodia and was turning the country into a massive, dedicated, and effective
rural base" (Grabar 2013). In the case of Cambodia, some literature even argues that one effect
of this destruction was a population prepared to foster the rise to power of the genocidal Pol Pot.
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But in Vietnam, according to the morale report, artillery and aerial bombardment led to
intense hatred towards Americans at a hugely significant rate. Be it heuristics or the truth, Viet
Cong members claimed that “when one innocent peasant is killed, ten rise in his place; when ten
are killed, one hundred will rise up” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Throughout the war, as the
U.S showered Vietnam in bombs and artillery, they were quite possibly strengthening both the
resolve and the number of troops to defeat.
Duty and Defense
As stated previously, it is evident that the context of French occupation as well as the
importance of unity and collectivism in Vietnamese culture led to both a propensity for
Communist philosophy and a deeply impactful duty to defend Vietnam on a national scale.
One important rhetorical device that I came across was hy sinh or “sacrifice” (Bradley
2009). I will elaborate more on Vietnamese reflections on this term in my analysis, but for now it
is important to note that Vietnamese people tended to associate this term with a high degree of
respect, a high sense of duty, and a specifically national orientation. During wartime, the ruling
party also took deliberate, public action to foster a feeling of honor surrounding war martyrs, or
liệt sĩ. (Bradley 2009). Again, recall the blurred line between civilian and military in Vietnam.
As referenced in Ho Chi Minh’s inspirational address, all members of society, not just the rich or
powerful, were explicitly encouraged and expected to contribute what they had to the war.
Vo Nguyen Giap echoes these sentiments: “to resist the American aggression, arms in
hand, for the sake of national salvation, is the most sacred duty of every Vietnamese patriot, of
every Vietnamese people” (Giap 1970). The power of this rhetoric is quite apparent. A people’s
war is a very specific kind of war; those not officially affiliated with the military were incredibly
important. These “people” were mothers, honored for their willingness to send their sons to fight
for the cause and families, who fed and took care of soldiers in their own homes. Most strikingly,
these people were Vietnamese in rural villages who literally took “arms in hand” to support the
revolutionary cause as guerilla fighters (Giap 1970).
Those in the traditional army, of course, were also “ready for the supreme sacrifice,” and,
according to the Rand report, “the most articulate and committed communist prisoners
interviewed by us stressed the voluntarism of the movement and pointed out that you cannot
make a revolutionary fighter of a person dragooned into service” (Hunt 2010; Donnell, Pauker,
Zasloff 1965). While some North Vietnamese were drafted into fighting, the vigor of the
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sentiments of these Viet Cong POWs seem to echo the observations of Chenoweth, that
Vietnamese culture deeply reflected the notion that “you can’t change people’s minds by force”
(Kernan 1978).
Differences in Military Morale: The U.S Army versus the Vietnam People’s Army
In addition to profiling the willingness of the army to make sacrifices for the sake of the
country, the reports on Viet Cong morale shed light on specific measures taken by the Vietnam
People’s Army to build and sustain dedication to the revolutionary cause. Overall, perhaps in a
nod to the Buddhist monks many associate with Vietnam, the Rand observers noted a “monkish
solidarity” among the Viet Cong. The POWs interviewed provided insight into the internal
organization of the army that both cultivated morale and constantly renewed a uniform
commitment to their cause. In daily meetings, Viet Cong units discussed specific topics: the
general spirit or morale of the unit; the internal unity and solidarity of the unit; the external unity
(between the unit and the civilian population); frugality; and an evaluation of the work
performance since the last meeting and allocation of jobs for the next day (Donnell, Pauker,
Zasloff 1965). Additionally, units implemented a “buddy system,” dividing into groups of three
soldiers. These units were impressively effective for political indoctrination as well as a
“psychological prophylaxis” against the trying tension and anxiety of wartime (Donnell, Pauker,
Zasloff 1965). I point out the effectiveness because, though the Viet Cong objectively fought in
deeper material squalor than the already difficult conditions facing the U.S army, Viet Cong
Prisoners of War repeatedly stated that they “live gloriously and die splendidly.” These teamand morale- building policies seem to be extraordinarily effective within the Vietnamese forces
(Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). Additionally, according to historian Le Van Lan, soldiers of the
U.S American Army required significantly more rations during wartime than did the Vietnam
People’s Army (Lan 2016). Perhaps, again, this was related to morale and commitment to their
cause.
Some observations from this report illicit an explicit contrast with the respective U.S
military mentality. According to one Viet Cong POW, in a sentiment that once again nods at the
observations of Chenoweth as a POW, “they fight only for pay…we are fighting for the just
cause” (Donnell, Pauker, Zasloff 1965). While U.S American soldiers were oftentimes plagued
with moral dilemmas and ambiguities about the war’s purpose, while young people were burning
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their draft cards and millions were protesting the war efforts from the U.S, while it seemed for
many that they would rather do anything else than fight in the Vietnam War, the fighters of the
Viet Cong apparently “[saw] no option but to keep on fighting” (Goure, Russo, Scott 1966).
That leads to what some might perceive as fallbacks of the American military mentality
during this period. Hopefully the contents of this report thus far have illustrated the various
forces that combined to create a passionate and mobilized North Vietnamese wartime mindset.
And indeed, as the Rand report indicates, this insight that was a surprise to many Americans in
the 1960’s. This report demonstrates that the U.S’s adversaries were well aware of our growing
weaknesses. And North Vietnam’s military strategy, General Giap’s “People’s War,” was
partially contingent upon impending American fatigue. Perhaps this explains why one veteran in
my focus group did not find it accurate to call Vietnam “tired” of foreign presence, as much of
Vietnam’s war strategy seemed to hinge, rather, on the U.S’s increasing exhaustion.
Ultimately, as Karnow (1997) astutely summarizes, “American strategists [had] an
ignorance of Vietnam’s history, a long and torturous series of conflicts and accommodations that
gave the Vietnamese a profound sense of their own identity.” This sense of identity revealed
itself time and time again throughout my data collection.
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Research Findings and Analysis
I will now provide two diagrams I conceived through reflection on my surveys and my
literature review in light of one another. As capturing a “mindset” is a task requiring inherent
flexibility, these diagrams might smooth the transition between some of the concepts of the
literature review and of the field research.

duty
hy sinh
Figure 1.3- Venn Diagram relating Duty and hy sinh (sacrifice)
This Venn diagram illustrates the overlap of: my findings when asking Hanoians about the word
“hy sinh” (sacrifice) and my secondary research regarding a North Vietnamese sense of duty.
This diagram should serve to show how (at least in the war context), Hanoian civilians, the
military, and the government seem to agree that duty and sacrifice for the good of the country go
hand-in-hand. Thus, the two circles are almost completely overlapping.
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-government rhetoric/ propaganda/
education
-“People’s War”
-all citizens are involved
-guerilla warfare*

Strongest part of North
Vietnam’s wartime strategy?

-corruption of
Southern
Vietnam
government Unity
-specific
military
strategies

Figure 1.4- Venn diagram relating North Vietnamese war strategy and impressions of unity
This Venn diagram outlines my findings when comparing literary research on Vietnamese
concepts of unity with survey research on perceptions of North Vietnam’s strongest wartime
strategy. Overwhelmingly, people cited “unity” as the most important strategy, even if it was
mentioned amongst more specific military strategies. Thus, the significant overlap of the two
circles. The text in the middle of the circles gives some general examples of government
mechanisms used to foster nationwide unity during wartime.
*I had some difficulty classifying guerilla warfare. I came to think it could be understood as both
embodying the deepest example of civilian commitment or an example of the flexibility in
divisions between civilian and military during wartime in Vietnam as compared to the US.

My research—both primary and secondary—has allowed me to identify what I think are
some key components of the North Vietnamese war mindset and historical perspective. The
relevant information I have identified from literature was largely consistent with my interview
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findings. Therefore, I will use similar organizational categories to present my interview and
survey findings, hopefully adding some depth, context, and humanity to my findings in literature.
It was my initial focus group that made me realize that while I was hoping for a more
general view on war, I would find the most information and perspective regarding the experience
of the American War in Vietnam. However, as America is a foreign superpower to Vietnam, the
history of foreign occupation cannot be disregarded and is immensely impactful in the
Vietnamese perspective.
Impact of Foreign Occupation
According to one survey taker, on the question of the importance of history to
Vietnamese people in their generation, history represents the “tradition to build the country and
keep the country of Vietnamese people.” Applying this to the question of rhetoric and
mobilizing, history becomes a highly politicized, deliberately employed and experienced
component of Vietnamese thinking; particularly for the ultimate goal of “building” and
“keeping” Vietnam. Considering how much of Vietnamese history is mired in defense against
foreign aggressors, it becomes clear how the past can rise to increased relevance in times of
conflict.
Additionally, the Vietnamese viewpoint towards foreign aggressors in the past is a
fruitful realm in which to consider rhetorical choices. In an early interview with Le Van Lan,
while introducing my topic, I referred to the war in question with the name I always had: “The
Vietnam War.” This seemingly introductory comment launched our conversation into the realm
of questioning rhetoric, with considering the impact of my calling the war “The Vietnam War.”
Polarizing wartime rhetoric has been employed throughout Vietnamese history,
beginning with naming the conflicts themselves. When Vietnam was struggling against French
domination, the conflict was popularly called “kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp” which
translates to “the war of resistance against the colonialist French.” Later, when Vietnam and the
United States were engaged in war, the conflict was referred to by a similar title, “kháng chiến
chống Mỹ, cứu nước.” This roughly translates to “resistance war against the imperialist
Americans, to save the country.” Now, pausing here, momentarily suspending whether we think
this sentiment is valid, it is easy to see that simply referring to a conflict with such strong
language can impact the national conversation about this conflict.
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I encountered similar language during my visit to Hỏa Lò prison, also known to prisoners
of war as the “Hanoi Hilton.” The prison site, now a popular museum, gives some insight into
the way history is explained to Hanoians and tourists alike. One section of the museum was
devoted to the experiences of American pilots that were held in Hỏa Lò as Prisoners of War
during the American War in Vietnam, and the language used to describe the era is quite telling.
For instance, in a video display explaining the American escalation of the war from 1964, the
English subtitles explain that not only were the U.S. government’s actions “extremely dangerous
moves up the war ladder,” but also “threaten[ed] even the world’s peace and security” (Hỏa Lò
2016). Additionally, in a panel providing an introduction to the United States-focused section of
the museum, the opening sentence establishes a similar perspective: “The United States
government carried out sabotage warfare by using their air and naval forces against the North of
Vietnam.” (Hỏa Lò 2016). These examples provide some insight into another contribution to the
national conversation about this conflict.
Unity as War Strategy: People’s Perspective
The War in Vietnam was realized not by cannon, by gun, by soldier…but the most important part
of this was propaganda and education.”
-Le Van Lan (2016)
My field research brought the findings of my literature review to life. When conducting
my focus group, for example, patriotism and determination were unanimously cited as the most
important part of North Vietnam’s wartime strategy.
My random oral surveying further substantiated these sentiments, reiterating the
importance of both civilian and military efforts during the war and shedding some light on the
people that bore the brunt of wartime losses. One participant’s quote provides a citizen’s opinion
on the government’s role during wartime: “We need the government to regulate the activities of
citizens, organize protests, [and] guide people.” This citizen’s perspective challenges the notion
that the government’s control over Vietnam is unwanted. In fact, especially during wartime,
Vietnamese people expressed to me a very deep devotion to their nation, sometimes at the price
of personal freedom. Hanoians are proud of their nation’s ability to rally for defense: “[the] spirit
of unity is very important;” “parents, children, everyone participated in war.” Expressed in
Vietnamese, “toàn dân kháng chiến” or “kháng chiến toàn dân,toàn diện, rường kỳ” meaning,
respectively “all people for the resistance,” and “all generations for the resistance.”
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Morale
“Vietnamese people love the country so much. Every time the invaders come, the patriotism intertwines
and becomes the wave to engulf the invaders.”
Focus group member, April 8th 2016

Gaining insight directly from Vietnamese people about their morale and attitude during
wartime was very revealing of the impact of the government’s rhetoric on the citizens’
vocabulary and worldview. Amongst my sample, comprising mostly people who answered the
surveys independently of discussion with one another, I heard many repeated phrases. For
example, when asking people about the roles of people they knew during wartime, I heard the
phrase “protect the country” multiple times. This is very powerful rhetoric. Not only does it
imply a high degree of perceived political efficacy from the citizenry, but it implies that the war
was one of defense and protection. This is an idea that is easy to rally around. Easier, for
example, than the U.S’ escalation of the war, clandestine bombings, all in the context of an
uncontrolled arena for free speech where dissatisfaction with the war could be expressed. On one
hand, this suggests an epistemological divide between Vietnam and the U.S: one nation attempts
to create truth through the transmissions of the government while the viewpoint of the other has
the chance to marinate in a somewhat liberal public sphere and be massaged by the agenda of the
government. Now, taking this comparison strictly from a strategic standpoint, it represents one
facet of Vietnam’s ability to mobilize behind this war: not only was their motive more easily
articulated, but it had a more direct and influential channel through which it was transmitted.
Rhetoric: People’s Perspective
As previously noted, as part of my field research, I asked people for their connotations
and reflections on Vietnamese words and phrases I encountered in my literature review. I hoped
to glean a sense of how the words were used specifically in a war context. Below are some of the
most common and most interesting responses I received about different terms:
Nhân Dân- “the people”
-“Vietnamese people were like heroes.”
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-“[during war, Nhân Dân experienced] suffering, lacking of things and family had to
suffer the damage.”
-“patriotism…”
-“heart has sentiment, protection, support, always give strength and confidence, citizen,
respectful, sacred/spiritual, beloved…”

I first came across this term in Vietnam at War (Bradley 2009). When asking Le Van Lan
about the term, his answer evidenced both Vietnamese unity and the Vietnamese perspective on
propaganda and communism. Nhân dân is a term very commonly employed by the Communist
party; it is, in fact, the name of the party’s official newspaper. Figures such as Ho Chi Minh and
General Giap oftentimes evoked rhetoric about how the Communist party and the government
“served” nhân dân, even going as far as to call the government a “slave” to the people.
According to Le Van Lan, people understand the employment of this slogan, “are happy about
it,” and are subsequently likely to do what the government asks of them. To illustrate the widelyencompassing sentiments behind both nhân dân and hy sinh, Le Van Lan shared a story of a poor
family in Quang Tri province whose house sustained significant war damage. Upon “receiving
the title nhân dân,” the family’s commitment to the war effort was reinvigorated; they donated
brick and other materials from their home to build a road for the Vietnam People’s Army.
Hy sinh- “sacrifice”
-“willingness to die to protect country”
-“die for protection of nation, die for citizens, willingness to give up anything like death, life, or
resource”
-“deny individual purpose and focus on collective actions of nation—would do anything during
wartime.”
-“gift of individual to contribute to protest, [for the sake of] national security, lots of youth die in
the military, but the family feels proud.”
-“willingness and respected duty of all citizens when country is in trouble”
-“it is a privilege to sacrifice for the country”
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Among the most striking aspects of these definitions are the words I underlined, which
suggest not only a tolerance or acceptance of the possibility of dying for the country, but a
“willingness” to do so, even calling sacrificing a “privilege” or“gift.” These quotes speak to the
morale of the Vietnamese people, but also of the collectivist nature of the Vietnamese mindset: a
literal “deny[ing] of individual purpose.” This calls to mind and brings context to the experience
of Nguyễn Đình Thi at the 1949 Conference of Debate in Việt Bắc. Though poetry with a selffocused or emotionally indulgent purpose can be refreshing and relatable, if the work of artists
and intellectuals has the impact on the society that the Communist Party says it does, the quotes
might exemplify some success stories of the Communist party controlling the public
conversation. Indeed, consider the sentiments expressed by ordinary Hanoians in 2016 alongside
those expressed by the previously mentioned General Giap (1970) in his explanation of People’s
War “to resist the American aggression, arms in hand, for the sake of national salvation, is the
most sacred duty of every Vietnamese patriot, of the entire Vietnamese people.” The two
different contexts, decades apart, employ remarkably similar rhetoric. Comparing this rhetorical
arena with U.S sentiments during this time highlights both the difference in control over public
dialogue between the U.S and Vietnam and the difference in dedication and attitude towards the
war.
Cuộc kháng chiến chống Mỹ, cứu nước- The War Against Imperialist America, to Save the
Country
-“the just cause”
-“the proud of the nation and the illustrious victory”
-“it was certain to be successful”
-“the loss of so many people was unnecessary”
-“that was the long fight of Vietnamese people. It created the significant loss for Vietnam in
terms of property and the people.”

Lastly, the way that the Vietnamese government and people refer to the war itself is
telling. When I originally chose to ask people about this term, I was expecting more of an
acknowledgement of the obviously partisan nature of this title. There was no such talk. In fact,
most sentiments expressed about this war were basically unanimous. What I was most interested
in was the different understanding of objective “facts” of the war, many of which were in direct
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opposition to the narrative I had grown up hearing. When asked, for example, if the United
States was “invading” or “intervening” in South Vietnam in the 70’s, not a single respondent said
the U.S’s actions served as a positive intervention. If they even mentioned the word intervention,
it was to express a thought that started something like “the United States may have thought they
were intervening, but…”
In this same sentiment were many of the answers I received when asking if my
participants felt a strong popular support for the North Vietnamese cause during this war.
-“people from all over the world supported Vietnam in the war against America”
-“Vietnamese people altogether supported the fight against America to protect the country.”
-“yes, because the war was ill-gotten.”
-“we didn’t want the war to happen, but because we were invaded we had to fight to protect the
country.”
-“The support from Russia and other socialist countries”
-“People, friends from all over the world supported Vietnamese people against the empire
invaders.”

These quotes characterize an important layer of the Vietnamese standpoint towards war,
one that can be enlightening when pondering Vietnam’s historical war victories; the history of
war in Vietnam is largely one of defense. Hanoians told me over and over again, in reference to
both themselves and their government, that Vietnamese people hate war. Yet it is this same
force, the force of patriotism and communalism and unity, that both fuels their strong distaste for
wars and fuels the logic and morale that ultimately tends to propel them to technical victory in
the wars they do end up in.
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The Language of Loss: Who won the war?
There’s a reason I say “technical victory.” One element of my research was to explore the
ways people talk about war and possibly begin to expose limits of this vernacular. I was
particularly interested in the word “lose” in the case of this war. By all traditional definitions of
the word “lose,” the United States “lost” the war in Vietnam. Yet, I have found that particularly
in an educational setting, it is not uncommon to witness Americans skirting around this language,
describing the end of the American War in Vietnam as a “withdrawal” rather than a “defeat.” At
the same time, in other countries, I found that there was no hesitation to call the American War
in Vietnam a loss, hard and fast. I noted additional nuances of the word “lose” when asking
people in Vietnam who won and lost the war. Most people I spoke to who experienced the
American War in Vietnam said, in so many words, one of two answers.
“The Americans lost the war but Vietnam lost so much more” or
“No one wins in war, and the people lose the most.”
I then checked with a bilingual friend regarding the flexibility of the word “loss”- wondering if,
like in English, the word could be used to describe both the outcome of a war and the action of
losing a life or property. It turns out that, like in English, this is the case in Vietnamese. When I
think, then, about the flexibility of this word, I think about the possibilities for fitting our speech
about war more accurately to the human dimension of war. By that I mean, thinking deeply about
the fact that rigid terminology—and the rigid logic it fosters—might not always be appropriate;
for war is ultimately a series of human interactions that, even if they combine for some larger
purpose within the war narrative, ultimately end up affecting these same humans the most.
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Conclusion
A quintessential lesson from this research is an endorsement of the simplicity of its
methods: the best way to learn about life during the American War in Vietnam is to talk to
people about their lives during the American War in Vietnam. This process is smoothed by
attempting to suspend political and moral bias regarding relations between the U.S and Vietnam
at this time.
It is important to acknowledge the more subtle and complex dimensions of this inquiry.
On a larger scale, this project is an attempt to navigate a pursuit for truth when the topic
at hand has multiple “truths” and possibly sensitive consequences for those involved. Thanks to
support from the academic staff, the openness of Vietnamese people, and the length of time that
has passed since this war occurred, my month in Hanoi presented an opportune situation to
pursue such analysis.
For North Vietnam, “People’s War” was a thoughtful and successful wartime strategy.
Due to centuries of foreign occupation that allowed revolutionary sentiment and wartime
readiness to fester, a sense of Vietnamese unity that is as historical as it is manufactured, the
galvanizing impact of bombs and other attacks, and a deep sense of duty and defense, North
Vietnam had an “inexhaustible” source of energy and dedication from both military members
and civilians during this conflict (Giap 1970). Additionally, a heavy government hand in the
public conversation, inspirational Vietnamese leaders, and support and rhetoric from the global
Communist movement helped sustain the nation’s energy during a conflict that was “won” by
outlasting the opponent.
The two opening quotes of the introduction illustrate the potential downfalls of ignoring
the successes and realities of North Vietnam’s wartime strategy: the first pointing to the
problems of government policy that is based on “impressions” and “intuitions” and the second to
the problems when the popular historical narrative is in fact “ahistorical.” While it can be
tempting to transmit our own versions of truth to others, it is vitally important to understand as
many sides of history as deeply as we can, to allow them to provide nuances to our own analysis,
to ultimately strengthen our own views and to promote diplomacy. There is certainly a time for
politics, a time for debating morals, but I believe that there is a danger in beginning these actions
too early in our analysis. Therefore, I invite readers to suspend moral bias.
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By committing to an approach based on constructivism, epistemology, and subsequently
rhetoric, increased holistic understanding of this period of history is possible. This analysis
allows a deeper look into words that might signal fear to Americans, allowing words like
Communism to be contextualized into Vietnam’s deeply historical and community-oriented
relationship with this philosophy. Readers may judge for themselves whether or not North
Vietnam’s actions were morally excusable, but to dismiss them before full consideration the
Vietnamese context is irresponsible. Lastly, a human-based analysis of this war may prove a
wise model for other international conflicts—a reminder that the quarreling nations are, in fact,
composed of people. A commitment to this analytical orientation when thinking about war can
provide richness to questions of “winning” and “losing,” challenging our familiar rhetoric to
better suit the complex realities of war.

Limits
This work would undoubtedly improve had I a greater knowledge of the Vietnamese
language. Not only would this ability have improved my sense of subtleties and patterns of
rhetoric in my participants’ speech, but it would have likely enhanced the information I could
find for my literature review as well. I am grateful, then, for the scholars who have chosen to
publish their work in English, as I am grateful to those multilingual individuals who have
translated Vietnamese content for an English-speaking audience. Perhaps focusing on rhetoric
was a naïve oversight; for it can indeed prove difficult to deepen analysis of a language you do
not speak. However, thanks to the fortune of being connected to many individuals with an
extensive grasp of both English and Vietnamese, I was able to get more information on those
subtleties that I did catch.
Regarding my field research, there were many opportunities for bias. For example, there
is a possibility that the citizens of Hanoi who choose to spend time in the public area of Hoan
Kiem Lake differ substantially from those who do not. In the same vein, I experienced some
people who refused to answer my questionnaire; some older, some government affiliated, and
some who claimed they did not know enough to talk to me about the war. This suggests more
potential for bias; perhaps there is a difference in opinion between those who are willing to
engage with a Western stranger about war and those who are not. Additionally, an unexpected
time restraint from Hanoi University rendered it difficult to gather more than 26 interviews.
While I feel confident that those 26 questionnaires combined with my other field research
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provided fruitful insight into the Vietnamese mindset, my survey population was a tiny subset of
the population. In general, the time constraints of this research period could have hindered my
ability to reach a certain level of depth on this topic. Lastly, there is always a possibility of social
desirability bias, where respondents might have censored their answers to cater to their
perceptions of what I was hoping to hear.

Further Research
I believe that a subsequent study with mirroring methodology regarding American
rhetoric of this war would be deeply informative. David Sutton’s The Rhetoric of the Vietnam
War: An Annotated Bibliography points at many articles which analyze U.S American rhetorical
choices, such as the controversially manipulated Tonkin Gulf narrative, and the pertinence of the
use of ‘aggressor’-focused language to describe the potential spread of Communism. Though I
was unable to gain access to many of these articles, I believe that this review could lead to
fruitful follow up research and a chance to put my own culture in this same light.
In terms of this study, as stated before, a deeper analysis of Vietnamese linguistics would
provide additional richness to these findings.
Were I to continue this line of inquiry, I would expand my focus of study to include more
of the non-governmental factors that shape the public’s mindset and the citizenry’s
conversations. I would spend more time looking at the impact of books, of film, of visual art and
poems. I am deeply curious to study the results of the Communist Party altering art at the
conferences I researched.
On the U.S American side, war films and literature have a very significant impact on the
public conversation about this war. Were I to continue pursuing this work, I would be interested
in both the most accurate and the most impactful of these forms of media for the United States.
Ultimately, the deepest curiosities that stemmed from this project were regarding the
epistemology of experiencing war. There is a fair amount of research regarding veterans’
memories, but from my findings, there is much more to explore regarding a philosophical
approach to this line of inquiry.
My initial vision for this work, which was quickly scaled down, was the development of
an educational syllabus. I envisioned a course that would encourage students to radically
empathize with the unfamiliar mindsets of this time, a course where the readings were the
highest quality narratives and the most provocative philosophies from the East and the West, and
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the lecturers were experienced in connecting over a troubled past. If I have the chance to
continue rounding out my understandings of the human dimension of war, perhaps this syllabus
will someday come to fruition.
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